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Abstract
Reform of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector in the late 1990s trig-
gered massive layoffs (34 million employees) and marked the end of the “Iron Rice
Bowl” guarantee of employment security for the remaining 67 million workers. An
expanding international literature has documented the adverse health impacts of eco-
nomic insecurity on adults, but has typically neglected children. This paper uses the
natural experiment of SOE reform to explore the causal relationship between in-
creased parental economic insecurity and children’s BMI Z-score. Using province-
year-level layoff rates and income loss from the layoffs, we estimate a generalised
difference-in-differences model with individual fixed effects and year fixed effects.
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For a medium-build 10-year-old boy, a median treatment effect implies a gain of 1.8
kg and a 2.2-percentage-point increase in the overweight rate due to the reform. The
weight gain for boys whose SOE parents kept their jobs indicates the importance of
anxiety about potential losses, as well as the experience of actual loss. Unconditional
quantile regressions suggest that boys who are heavier are more likely to gain weight.
Girls are not significantly affected. Intergenerational effects therefore increase the
estimated public health costs of greater economic insecurity.
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1 Introduction
Numerous authors have argued that economic insecurity has been on a gradual rise since
the 1970s in many countries,1 with adverse implications for family dissolution (Larson
and Holman, 1994) and individual health (Rohde, Tang, Osberg, and Rao, 2016; Watson,
Osberg, and Phipps, 2016; Tsutsumi, Kayaba, Theorell, and Siegrist, 2001). Yet rarely
has economic insecurity surged as dramatically and influentially as in China during the
late 1990s. After almost 50 years of unequivocal “Iron Rice Bowl” guarantees of job
security, 34 million workers were laid off between 1995 and 2001 in the reform of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), thereby massively heightening the insecurity of the 67 million
continuing SOE employees.2 The magnitude and speed of these changes were historically
unprecedented.
An expanding literature has argued that greater economic insecurity increases weight
gain in adults in developed countries (Smith, Stoddard, Barnes, et al., 2009; Offer, Pechey,
and Ulijaszek, 2010; Watson, Osberg, and Phipps, 2016; Rohde, Tang, and Osberg, 2017).
However, disentangling the causal impacts of increased economic insecurity on health
from other influences requires that we identify a plausible exogenous change in economic
insecurity. This paper argues that SOE reform in China was an unanticipated change for
the hundred-million employees affected, and caused change in family circumstances that
was exogenous for their children. We therefore exploit the natural experiment of SOE
reform to examine the causal relationship between changes in economic insecurity and
child outcomes.
Our innovations include (1) examination of the causal intergenerational effects of
1See, for example, Osberg and Sharpe (2009); D’Ambrosio and Rohde (2014); Blanchflower and Oswald
(1999); Anderson and Pontusson (2007); and Hacker, Huber, Nichols, Rehm, Schlesinger, Valletta, and
Craig (2014).
2Based on the calculations of Giles, Park, and Cai (2006) using China Statistical Yearbook 2002, National
Bureau of Statistics and China Labour and Social Security Yearbook 2002, Ministry of Labour.
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economic insecurity; (2) hypothetical counterfactual analysis suggesting that the layoff
policy resulted in a 2.2-percentage-point reduction in the probability of being overweight
in affected children; (3) separation of the impacts of anticipation of job loss from the
actual experience (we find evidence of weight gain for children whose parents were not
actually laid off, highlighting the negative impact of anxiety about job loss); (4) exami-
nation of gender differences in the types of child impacts (the Body Mass Index Z-score3
increases significantly for boys but not for girls); (5) testing whether already heavier chil-
dren gain more weight (which suggests more negative consequences for overweight and
obese children); and (6) investigation of the health impacts of economic insecurity in an
emerging economy, China.
We use total observed SOE layoffs at the province-year level as our measure of ex-
ogenous variation of economic insecurity, and non-SOEs as a control group, as the policy
change only applied to SOE employees.4 Our generalised difference-in-differences (DID)
methodology (two-way fixed-effects model) differences out unobserved pre-existing vari-
ations between the SOE (treated group) and the non-SOE (control group). Individual
fixed effects and year fixed effects are used to address omitted variable bias. Robustness
checks control for specific provincial characteristics that could affect provinces differently
over time. Since there is a possibility that in general equilibrium, the non-SOEs (control
group) could have been affected by the SOE layoffs, we argue that this paper presents a
lower-bound estimate of impacts. Finally, we employ unconditional quantile regressions
to show that heavy boys gain more weight, while thin boys are not significantly affected
by the layoffs.
3Body Mass Index (BMI) is defined as the body weight in kilograms divided by the square of the body
height in metres. The Z-score measures how many standard deviations the child is from the median in
age-gender-specific growth references. See Section 4.2 for detail.
4We suggest that because, in a Chinese context, the hukou (national registration) system minimises geo-
graphic mobility by binding individuals to their birthplace, there is little reason to think that the possible
migration response to SOE layoffs is quantitatively significant.
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Section 2 gives a brief background of the SOE reform and the exogeneity of the
layoff policy, followed by discussion of the mechanisms that connect health and economic
insecurity in Section 3. We describe data and key variables in Section 4 and identification
in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main findings. Robustness checks, heterogeneous
effects, and quantile regressions are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 China’s SOE Reform
During Mao Zedong’s era, China was a planned economy. Jobs were assigned according
to quotas set by the government, and job candidates had little freedom to choose their
employment. Lifelong employment of urban workers was provided by the government,
with benefits that included child care, health care, housing and pensions (Lee, 2000).
SOE employment, therefore, was considered an “Iron Rice Bowl”, with no economic
insecurity.
Inefficiency in resource allocation and the lack of work incentives motivated a pol-
icy change to break the Iron Rice Bowl. SOE reform was carried out in stages: In 1995,
a new labour law allowed the dismissal of no-fault workers, and a new term, xia gang
(layoff), was invoked and used in the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (CLSY).5 The
policy started with “grasp the large and let go of the small” (zhua da fang xiao), meaning
that the layoffs were only allowed in small-sized enterprises.6 In 1997, layoffs were fur-
5See Department of Population and Employment Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, P.R.C. and Depart-
ment of Overall Planning and Wages, Ministry of Labour, P.R.C. (1996, p. 410), Table 8-2 Surplus per-
sonnel in local enterprises by region (1995), column “Persons going off sentry duty” in English or “Num-
ber of xiagang workers” in Chinese.
6A small-sized enterprise is defined specifically by industry according to its revenue and number of
employees. For more detail, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-09/01/content_
2027929.htm.
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ther intensified by extending the new labour law to large-scale SOEs. From 1995 to 2001,
SOE employment dropped from 113 million to 67 million—a 40% decrease.7 According
to the calculation of Giles, Park, and Cai (2006) using the China Urban Labour Survey,
these layoffs caused the unemployment rate to surge to more than 10%, and labour force
participation to decline by up to 8.9% in representative cities.
The SOE reform introduced employment uncertainty for the first time since es-
tablishment of the Communist government in 1949 (Giles et al., 2006). Layoffs from
the SOE reform were particularly harsh on SOE workers, because (1) the SOE sector
in China had never witnessed employment uncertainty before this layoff policy, imply-
ing that workers typically had no job search experience or precautionary savings, and
hence workers were especially unprepared. Job losses were unanticipated and involun-
tary. (2) The social safety net was (and remains) underdeveloped in China, and thus little
social assistance or job-search assistance was provided to laid-off workers. (3) Laid-off
workers were mostly older, unskilled, and female, which added to the challenges of re-
employment. These disadvantages rendered the economic insecurity to which they were
subjected particularly significant.
2.2 Exogeneity of the Layoff Policy
This paper suggests that the natural experiment of SOE reform provides exogenous varia-
tion in economic insecurity. SOE reform had impacts of different intensity across provinces
and years, which enables us to identify province-year variation in measured economic in-
security.
Figure 1 presents economic insecurity (i.e., expected economic loss; see Section
4.3) in SOEs by year and province. Figure 2 shows the map of sample provinces with
7According to Giles et al. (2006), employment dropped by 46 million in SOEs, of which 34 million were
officially registered as xia gang (laid off) during this period.
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expected economic loss in SOEs and peak layoff years. The expected loss varied across
provinces and over time. For example, Liaoning, in Northeastern China, had a peak
layoff rate of 16% and a financial loss of 84% if laid off in 1999; this generated a 13%
(=16%*84%) expected value of economic loss for SOE workers. Shandong had its highest
layoff rate of 4% in 2000, accompanied by a 77% financial loss in the case of layoffs, and
thus a 3%(=4%*77%) expected economic loss for SOE workers.
We argue that the layoff policy for SOE employees in a given province and year
is exogenous to individual families. In China, the hukou, or National Household Reg-
istration Book, binds individuals to their birthplace. Little across-province mobility is
allowed to maintain eligibility for children’s schooling, social benefits, job opportunities,
and local benefits. The new layoff policy had larger impacts in provinces with a high
heavy-industry concentration due to arrangements that were made long prior to the re-
form based on the strategic locations of, e.g., mineral deposits and gas fields. Even with
the deterioration in job stability, income, and benefits in the state sector, SOE workers
still have little incentive or ability to move to the non-SOE sector, since average income
and health care in the SOE is significantly higher, even after the SOE reform. Thus,
individuals are unlikely to respond to the risk of layoff by voluntary job mobility.
3 Mechanisms: Overeating and Economic Insecurity
3.1 Biological Background
Recent articles finding a relationship between adult weight gain and economic insecurity
include Offer et al. (2010), who use macro-level data from 11 developed countries over 10
years and suggest that the obesity epidemic is mainly driven by greater social insecurity.
In psychology and neuroscience, stress has been linked to overeating (Greeno and Wing,
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1994), because anxiety and stress induce people to turn to “comfort food” that is high
in calories and fat (Dallman et al., 2003). Smith (2009) suggests that like other animals,
humans compensate for food uncertainty by overeating and storing body fat. The ability
to store body fat is a functional survival instinct when the risk of starvation is present, and
over millennia, overeating has been genetically hard-wired as a response to anxiety about
future food availability. Although the risk of starvation is now minimal in affluent soci-
eties, economic uncertainties (such as a sudden risk of layoff from a previously secure
job) still cause stress and anxiety. In the presence of such economic hazards, overeat-
ing can be seen as a form of “self-medication” for stress—as the phrase “comfort food”
suggests.8
Therefore, where socioeconomic supports do not provide much protection against
economic losses, people tend to gain more weight when economic stress increases. Con-
versely, when risk of economic loss is well-insured by social programs, even in the pres-
ence of abundant calorie-rich food, obesity prevalence is lower. Smith et al. (2009) use
12-year panel data from the U.S National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and find that a
1-percentage-point rise in the probability of becoming unemployed increases adult weight
gain by 0.6 pounds, but the availability of a social safety net decreases the negative ef-
fect of economic insecurity. Using Canadian Community Health Survey data, Watson
et al. (2016) exploit unemployment insurance benefit cuts in the 1990s as an exogenous
natural experiment variation in economic insecurity, and establish a causal relationship
between economic insecurity and BMI gain in adults. Rohde et al. (2017) use the House-
hold, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey and find that economic
insecurity and adult obesity form a self-sustaining vicious cycle.
8In the Chinese context, it is worth noting that parents in the state sector have higher incomes than those
in the non-state sector (see Table 1). Therefore, parents are economically able to purchase calorie-rich
food.
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3.2 Intergenerational Transmission
In this paper, we examine intergenerational impacts and propose that greater economic
insecurity of the family can have impacts on children. One potential transmission mecha-
nism is that greater risk of loss of future SOE benefits (which include the parents’ pension
entitlements) may increase in-kind precautionary savings of the family, in the form of “fat-
tening up the little emperor” by the family. A second is that uncertainty about the future
may trigger increases in parents’ work hours to compensate for potential economic losses,
reducing time investment and positive interactions with the child. Third, eating healthily
takes time and energy. Economic insecurity causes mental stress for parents, and stressed
parents may make poorer nutrition choices, allow the child access to “junk food”, and be
less likely to enforce rules that keep their children eating healthy food. Last, intra-family
contagion may directly cause the child to overeat as children sense the heightened anxiety
of their parents due to economic stress.
4 Data
4.1 The China Health and Nutrition Survey
This paper combines microdata from the China Nutrition and Health Survey (CHNS) with
macrodata from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (CLSY). The CHNS is conducted
by the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the Chinese Center for Disease
Control and Prevention. The CHNS is the only large-scale longitudinal household-level
survey in China (Popkin et al., 2010), and consists of 9 waves, from 1989 to 2011, of
more than 4,000 households and 15,000 individuals. Data include detailed economic,
health, sociological, and demographic information. Households were selected in both
rural and urban areas in eight provinces: Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei,
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Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, using a multistage, random cluster design, stratified by
income.
Household members of all ages were interviewed during the survey, and children
younger than 10 years were assisted by their parents. Children’s height and weight were
taken on site by CHNS interviewers who received seven days of training by collaborating
teams (Yan et al., 2012). Children were measured without shoes and with light clothes to
the nearest 0.1 cm for height and 0.1 kg for weight. Special efforts were made to interview
during early-morning hours or on weekends to avoid missing migrant workers or children
who attend boarding school. The attrition rate at the household level was 10% from the
previous cycle, and 31% from 1989 to 2006 (Popkin et al., 2010).
The CHNS has several features that make it particularly suitable for our study. First,
the longitudinal structure enables the comparison of outcomes of the same child before,
during, and after the SOE reform period. Second, the large sample size enables analy-
sis based on provincial heterogeneity, as well as differences between state and non-state
enterprises. Third, the CHNS has data not only on a single household member, but also
on parents, spouses, and children based on person-specific interviews, making it ideal for
examining the spillover effects of economic insecurity. Fourth, CHNS interview ques-
tions cover not only labour market outcomes, such as the employment status, sectors, and
earnings of both parents, but also the health outcomes of the child and other demographic
characteristics of the family. The extensive and in-depth information enables the inclusion
of almost all control variables used in related literature.
Our macrodata on layoffs come from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook pro-
duced by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It reports the number of laid-off
workers and the number of state-sector employees at year-end by province from 1995 to
2005. These two variables allow estimates of the layoff rate across provinces and over
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time. It also reports off-post (laid-off) state sector workers’ living subsidies and on-post
(on the job) SOE workers’ average wage by province, which enables the average financial
loss from SOE layoff to be calculated (see Appendix I for more detail).
4.2 Child Weight Measures
World Health Organization (2000) and Cole et al. (2000) have documented the dramatic
increase in obesity prevalence in developed countries. Although malnutrition and infec-
tious diseases are declining, obesity, cardiovascular disease, and type 2 diabetes are rising
(World Health Organization, 2000). In 2011, 30% of Chinese adults and 11% of Chinese
children were overweight (Yan et al., 2012). Child obesity not only leads to adult obesity
(Reilly and Kelly, 2011; Guo et al., 1994; Sørensen and Sonne-Holm, 1988), but also
to chronic diseases, such as impaired glucose metabolism, hypertension, and coronary
artery disease (Kavey et al., 2003). Child obesity is particularly linked to the develop-
ment of type 2 diabetes at a younger age (World Health Organization, 2000), and can also
adversely influence psychological well-being later in life (Friedman and Brownell, 1995).
To account for rates of maturation and growth, we use the BMI Z-score from the
World Health Organization (WHO) growth standard (Onis, 2006; Onis et al., 2007), which
measures how many standard deviations (SDs) the child is from the median BMI using
the age-gender-specific distribution, and thereby reflects the different standards at each
growth stage of children.9
9Observations that are over 5 SDs from the median are excluded in the sample according to WHO-
recommended outlier cutoffs.
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4.3 Measures of Economic Insecurity
Our conception of economic insecurity is that it is driven by a perceived, unavoidable
downside economic risk (Osberg, 1998, 2015). We use three indicators for SOE employ-
ees, at the province-year level: (1) probability of job loss (LayoffRate), i.e., the number of
laid-off SOE workers divided by the total number of SOE workers; (2) average financial
loss if laid off (FinancialLoss), i.e., the average percentage income drop for laid-off work-
ers; and (3) the expectation of economic loss for SOE employees (E(Loss)=LayoffRate*FinancialLoss),
i.e., the product of layoff rate and financial loss if laid off.
In our estimations, we use the most recent 3 years’ average layoff rate and financial
loss by provinces for three reasons. First, as the current economic situation is pending,
parents likely form their economic expectations using information from the immediate
past. Second, weight gain is a cumulative process, which takes a while to observe. Third,
the 3-year average allows intergenerational effects to be transmitted from parents to chil-
dren. The average of the most recent 2 years and the lagged layoff rate were also tested,
with highly consistent results.
4.4 SOE and Non-SOE (Treated and Control)
To obtain exogenous assignment of treated and control groups, we use the pre-reform
SOE and non-SOE status of parental work affiliation following Wang (2012). Our treated
group is children in families where parents were in SOEs, i.e., if either parent reported the
work unit type as “state enterprise or institute” prior to the SOE reform (in 1989 or the
next available pre-reform cycle in 1991 or 1993), the child is identified as being in SOEs
(treated group). Other children are in the control group, i.e., non-SOEs.10 Though not
10For children whose parents work in the collective sector (local government-owned enterprises), we in-
clude and exclude them in the analyses, with highly consistent results.
10
all SOE families experienced a layoff, all SOE employees experienced a change in their
degree of economic insecurity due to the increased chance of being laid off. Therefore,
the treatment of greater economic insecurity affected all SOE workers and their families.
In the sample, 14% of fathers and 8% of mothers worked in the SOE before the
reform. In total the SOE accounted for 15% of children. In Section 7.3, we also explore
the variations in father, mother and both parents in the SOE.
4.5 Sample
Our sample is children and adolescents 4 to 18 years old in every cycle who entered the
survey in 1989, 1991 or 1993 (pre-reform cycles). We only include the CHNS urban
sample because SOEs are in urban areas and the enormous disparity between rural and
urban areas in China could potentially confound the treatment effects. The birth cohort
of the sample is 1979 to 1993 and is observed in 1997, 2000, and 2004. There are 2,252
children and adolescents in the longitudinal sample and 3,566 observations in the pooled
cross-sectional sample.
We use the CHNS waves of 1997, 2000 and 2004. Unlike the standard DID strategy
that would add before-policy cycles (1989, 1991 and 1993), we focus only on the during-
policy period for two reasons: consistency of treatment and clean identification. First,
the main variables of interest, treatment intensity at the province-year level, are from the
China Labour Statistical Yearbook. From 1995 to 2004, the yearbook provides consistent
information on “laid off workers”. Prior to 1995, the term “surplus workers” was used to
describe those who had labour contracts with the SOE but no actual jobs. For consistency
of treatment, we only include years with the same layoff measurement. Second, the DID
strategy would require that no other policy change affected the treated group around 1995.
However, an SOE housing reform (which allowed SOE employees to purchase housing
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at a low price) was uniformly introduced in China in 1994 (Wang, 2012), which puts this
assumption in question. We therefore estimate the layoff policy’s effect making use of
its different intensity levels between 1997 and 2001 and using individual fixed effects to
control for pre-existing differences across individuals, such as those potentially caused by
the SOE housing reform. As the purpose of the paper is to compare treatments of different
intensity using DID, pre- and post- periods are not necessarily required for this purpose.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the outcome variable, measures of eco-
nomic insecurity, and control variables in SOEs and non-SOEs. Compared to the con-
trol group (i.e., non-SOEs), the treated group (i.e., SOEs) has higher equivalent income,
child’s BMI Z-score, and larger household size. Pre-existing differences in control vari-
ables (e.g., income) between the SOE and non-SOE are differenced out by the identifica-
tion in DID. We illustrate the identification in the next section.
5 Identification: The Layoff Policy Causes Child Weight
Gain
5.1 Generalised DID
To evaluate the causal effects of changes in parental economic insecurity on child out-
comes, we adopt a generalised DID framework with individual and year fixed effects.
The underlying idea is to not only compare the differences between the SOE and non-
SOE, but also use variations that result from different intensity of the layoff program
within the SOE sector. The baseline regression model is
BMIZipt = β1SOEip ·E(Loss)pt +β2E(Loss)pt +Witγ+Xptδ +dt +αi+ εipt (1)
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in which BMIZipt is the BMI Z-score for child i in province p and year t. SOEip is a treated
group indicator. Economic insecurity is measured by expected value of economic loss,
E(Loss), which is the product of the layoff rate and the average financial loss of laid-off
SOE workers for province p and year t. Wipt , a vector of individual characteristics, in-
cludes log equivalent income and number of children in the family, parents’ self-reported
health, marital status of the mother, puberty onset of the child, and whether grandparent(s)
live in the same household. Xpt captures time-variant province level characteristics, such
as provincial GDP per capita (see Xpt in details in Section 7.1) Year fixed effects, dt ,
control for common trends that affected all individuals similarly. Individual fixed effects,
αi, control for pre-existing and time-invariant person-specific characteristics.
Our hypothesis is that provinces featuring a higher layoff rate have higher weight
gains of children in the SOE treated group. The difference between the SOE and the
non-SOE is captured by the individual fixed effects. β2 estimates the effect of expected
economic loss that is common for both SOEs and non-SOEs. The parameter of interest,
β1, estimates the extra layoff effect only on the treated group, i.e., those children with SOE
parents. It captures the difference between high and low layoff intensity within the SOE.
Under our hypothesis that greater economic insecurity causes weight gain in children, β1
is expected to have a positive sign.
To validate the generalised DID, we address the following three assumptions:
1. Trends in the SOEs and non-SOEs would have been similar in the absence of the
reform. To test this assumption, we present parallel trends in the next subsection.
2. SOE reform only affects the SOEs, not the non-SOEs. To satisfy this condition,
(1) we include the term E(Loss)pt to capture any common effects on both SOEs
and non-SOEs, and the interaction of SOEip ·E(Loss)pt to capture any additional
effects on the SOEs; and (2) we include non-SOE employment and GDP share in
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the robustness test section.
3. No other factors could be systematically correlated with both intensity of the lay-
off policy and SOE children’s outcomes. To test this assumption, we control for
confounding events during the reform periods in the robustness test (Section 7.1).
Standard errors are clustered at the province level to allow for any within-province corre-
lation. We also conduct the clustered wild bootstrap-t procedure suggested by Cameron
et al. (2008) to correct the bias for over-rejection of a null hypothesis from a small number
of clusters. All regressions are estimated separately for girls and boys.
5.2 Parallel Trends
The panel DID identification methodology assumes that the outcomes in the treated group
(SOE) and the control groups (non-SOE) would have been the same in the absence of
treatment. Figure 3 presents fathers’ and mothers’ employment rates, and average child
BMI Z-score for treated and control groups over time. It shows that parents’ employment
rates start at a similar level in the SOE and non-SOE. The SOE employment rate becomes
lower than the non-SOE during the reform period, and follows a similar trend after the
reform. Average BMI Z-scores between SOE and non-SOE exhibit the same trends before
the reform in 1993, diverge during the reform in 1997 and 2000, and converge after the
reform in 2004.11
Following Jacobson et al. (1993), we also estimate the following regression to test
pre-existing trends:
BMIZipt =
2006
∑
t=1991
αtdt ·SOEip+
2006
∑
t=1991
γtdt +Xitβ +δi+ eipt (2)
11Note that for outcome variables, data are available from 1989 to 2004, while the layoff rate is only avail-
able from 1995 to 2005. Therefore, regression analyses are done using the data from 1997 to 2004,
while the parallel trend can be generated using a broader time span.
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where αt captures the extra time effect on SOEs. The hypothesis is that there is no sig-
nificantly different trend between the SOEs and non-SOEs before the introduction of the
layoff policy. Figure 4 shows the parameter of interest, αt . It demonstrates that before
introduction of the policy, treated and control groups are not significantly different; i.e.,
they have a similar trend. During the policy the outcomes diverge, i.e., the SOE reform is
the driving force for the difference. Therefore, we argue that no difference in pre-existing
trends is found.
6 Main Results
In our data, the median of expected economic loss is 4.26%. Our numeric examples show
by how many SDs the outcome variables can be expected to change if layoffs increase
by 4.26 percentage points. An intuitive calculation is to ask, if a 10-year-old child was at
the 50th percentile of the weight measures, how much change would be expected from a
4.26-percentage-point increase in expected economic loss?
Table 2 reports estimates of the key variables of Equation 1 as income, child and
household controls, provincial controls, and year fixed effects are added. In the boy panel,
which reports estimates of BMI Z scores, β1, the E(Loss)·SOE coefficient, is statistically
significant and fairly consistent in size, with a range of 9.3 to 12, suggesting that the
reform significantly increased the BMIZ in boys with SOE parents relative to boys with
non-SOE parents. Our preferred estimate, using all controls, is reported in column 4 and
implies that a 4.26-percentage-point change in expected economic loss will increase the
BMIZ by 0.42 SD. For a 10-year-old boy at the median distribution (BMI = 16.4kg/m2),
this implies a shift to the 67th percentile (BMI = 17.3kg/m2), and, if the boy is of median
height, his weight increases from 31.1 to 32.9 kg (i.e., 1.8 kg of weight gain).12
12Calculations are based on linear approximation WHO standards. The median height for 10-year-old
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To report our results, we also compare the actual BMIZ distribution for boys with
counterfactual estimates of the BMIZ distribution if the SOE reform had not occurred. Us-
ing our model, we estimate children’s BMIZ without the SOE reform, i.e., when E(Loss)=
0, to obtain the hypothetical counterfactual BMIZ. The difference between the real BMIZ
and the hypothetical counterfactual BMIZ is the reform effect.
To construct the hypothetical counterfactual results, we use the following steps:
1. Predict ˆBMIZipt |Xipt using the baseline model.
2. Obtain the person-specific random error term in the regression ui = ˆBMIZipt −
BMIZipt .
3. Calculate the new BMIZ0ipt = (BMIZipt |E(Loss)pt = 0)+ui.
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the BMIZ, with and without SOE reform. We can
see that the reform shifted the distribution of BMIZ to the right. In other words, children
would have had smaller BMIZ if the SOE reform had not occurred.
For the many children whose initial weight was relatively low, the health impacts
of additional weight may not be consequential, but being overweight as a child has been
shown to predict adult obesity, cardiovascular disease, and type 2 diabetes. We calculate
the change in the overweight rate using the real and counterfactual BMIZ, and adopting
Cole et al. (2000) threshold, which adjusts for age and gender growth standards.13 In our
sample, the actual overweight rate is 5.4% for real BMIZ (i.e., with SOE reform), which
can be compared to 3.2% for the hypothetical counterfactual BMIZ without SOE reform—
boy is 137.8 cm. See BMI-for-age Boys in 2007 WHO Reference, available at http://www.who.int/
growthref/who2007_bmi_for_age/en/.
13One caveat is that Cole et al. (2000) is not specifically constructed for Chinese children during the sur-
vey period. Therefore, we focus on change in the overweight rates rather than the overweight rate alone.
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i.e., a 2.2-percentage-point increase in the overweight rate due to the SOE reform. We
argue that the increase in child overweight rate is a sizable and plausible effect.
6.1 Estimation on No-actual-job-loss Sample
An important issue for the analysis of economic insecurity is whether anxiety regarding
anticipated possible events or the actual experience of such events is the source of stress.
In the SOE reform in China, some 67 million workers were suddenly exposed to a new
risk and presumably worried about possible job loss, but in the end did not actually lose
their jobs. Hence, an important question is whether, and to what extent, an increase in
economic insecurity affects health outcomes for those who in the end do not actually
experience joblessness. We therefore split the SOE sample and re-estimate the “worriers”
about job loss separately from the “actuals”. We note that once SOE workers are laid off
the feared event has happened, so uncertainty has been resolved, but we also expect to
observe an income effect, since those actually laid off will lose wages. To disentangle the
uncertainty effect from the income effect, we limit the sample to children whose parents
in the SOE and non-SOE sectors who always have jobs at the time of the interview and
have not changed jobs since the last survey (856 children are excluded). By limiting the
“always having a job” sample and employing the same generalised DID model, our results
isolate the effects of increased worry about possible job loss.
Table 3 presents the results for Equation 1 in the never-lost-job sample. In the boy
panel, BMIZ is still positively and statistically significantly affected by E(Loss) ·SOE, but
the magnitude of the impact is consistently larger than in Table 2 (ranging from 12.2 to
14.2). In our preferred specification (column 4), compared with estimates using the full
sample in Table 2, the effects of layoffs on boys’ BMIZ is roughly one-third larger: 13.1
compared to 9.9. If there is a 4.26-percentage-point increase (median treatment effect) in
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parents’ expected value of economic loss, the median 10-year-old boy’s BMIZ increases
from 0 SD to 0.56 SD. According to the WHO table, this corresponds to weight gain from
BMI 16.4 kg/m2, to 17.58 kg/m2. At the median height, there is a weight gain from 31.1
to 33.4 kg (i.e., a 2.3 kg increase). In the girl panel in Table 3, results are still statistically
insignificant.
We read these results as indicating that when Chinese parents start to worry about
potential job loss, their sons’ weight increases significantly. However, the larger impact on
boys in the never-lost-job sample and the gender differences in impacts require discussion.
We speculate that the income effects of actual job loss offset some of the anxiety effects
of worrying about job loss. Parents who actually lost their jobs might have wanted to feed
their “little emperors” more, but were constrained by the decline in their income. For
parents who did not lose their jobs, the anxiety effects on extra feeding of their sons are
less limited by income, and hence, a larger impact of increased insecurity is plausible.
Boys are more likely to gain weight; BMIZ scores for girls are not significantly af-
fected. We speculate that the main issue is that in the Chinese context, gender differences
stem from different parent-child expectations and responses. In China, the underdevel-
oped nature of financial markets and the lack of a welfare state mean that family obliga-
tions remain individuals’ main protection against economic insecurity (Cai et al., 2013).
For example, Zhou (2014) finds that sons in China share more financial responsibilities
than daughters for taking care of elderly parents. The SOE reform put both parents’ short-
term income and long-term pension benefits at risk. Parents who are more worried about
their financial future may want to feed their sons first, as an indirect channel of investing
in their old-age support. Kong (2017) shows that when a Chinese family is under eco-
nomic stress, the son’s caloric intake increases significantly (primarily from carbohydrate
intake) compared to the daughter’s. We thus argue that parents may project their economic
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anxiety into the dysfunctional feeding of sons, fattening up the “little emperors”.
By contrast, daughters in Chinese families are considered “married off” to other
households once they reach adulthood. Unlike boys, parents do not increase the amount
of food they feed their daughters in response to economic stress (Kong, 2017). Girls’
reactions to increased family stress may be to internalise stress, experienced through a
change in anxiety levels, as Essex et al. (2003) found. It is also possible that parental
financial stress leads to irrational and inconsistent parenting behaviour and girls are more
likely to develop anxiety and emotional disorders as a result (Kong and Phipps, 2016).
7 Further Results
7.1 Robustness Check on Generalised DID
The generalised DID method rules out any province-year-level factors that affect treated
and control groups differently—a core assumption that one should test directly. For ex-
ample, if the Asian financial crisis in 1998 affected coastal and more developed provinces
more heavily, or if the expansion of Western fast food restaurants was greater in more pop-
ulated provinces, this might differentially affect SOEs and non-SOEs and thereby bias our
estimates of child obesity.
Our identification strategy also requires an assumption that the layoff policy only
affected the treated group, not the control group. One concern is that the layoff policy
may increase labour supply, and therefore increase uncertainty/pressure for non-SOE em-
ployees.
To address these concerns, we add a rich set of province-year-level characteristics
to control for potential confounding factors. We control for birth rate, population, em-
ployment rate, percentage of GDP in SOEs and non-SOEs, urban disposable income, and
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average wage in the non-SOE sector at province-year level.
Table 4 presents the estimates after controlling for time-variant provincial charac-
teristics. The results are consistent with the estimates in Tables 2.14 ,15
While the DID estimates assume the control group (non-SOE) is constant, and our
methodology is based on the difference in economic insecurity between the SOE and non-
SOE, one could also argue that layoffs from the SOE could potentially affect the economic
insecurity of workers in the non-SOE (which could attenuate our results). To investigate
the effects of possible changes in economic insecurity of the non-SOE, we use employ-
ment rates of the non-SOE (i.e., as a proxy for possibility of job loss in non-SOEs),
and percentage of GDP share in non-SOE sectors (i.e., as a proxy for financial loss in
non-SOEs) at the province-year level reported in the China Labour Statistical Yearbook.
Figure 6 shows that the employment rate and GDP share declined in the SOE sector and
increased in the non-SOE sector. This suggests that as economic insecurity in the SOE
escalated, economic insecurity in non-SOEs started to decline, due to more employment
opportunities and greater aggregate income share. This implies that the gap we measured
in our baseline model is in fact smaller than the actual decline in economic insecurity
in the SOE—i.e., we underestimate the actual economic insecurity change for SOE em-
ployees, and the baseline DID provides a lower-bound estimation, as shown in Figure
7.
14Robustness checks are also done using layoff rate as the measure of economic insecurity. Results are
significant and available upon request.
15We also examine physical activity levels. Approximately 10% more children in the SOE answered
“Yes” to “Usually does physical exercises?” than children in the non-SOEs in all cycles of analysis.
Therefore, we rule out that physical activity contributes to the change in outcomes between SOE and
non-SOE children.
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7.2 Economic Insecurity Decomposed
Because job loss has non-monetary dimensions in addition to its financial impacts, it is
of interest to decompose increased economic insecurity (i.e., expected economic loss) by
separating the increased possibility of job loss and the severity of financial loss if laid off:
Yipt = β1SOEip ·LayoffRatept +β2SOEip ·FinancialLosspt
+β3LayoffRatept +β4FinancialLosspt +Witβ5 +Xptβ6 +dt +αi+ εipt (3)
The variables of interest are SOEip · LayoffRatept (changes in layoff rate in SOE by
province) and SOEip ·FinancialLosspt (changes in financial loss in SOE if laid off). The
coefficients β1 and β2 are expected to be positive. Indeed, if the impacts of unemploy-
ment were purely financial, the impacts of unemployment and an equal expected value
change in unemployment benefits should be roughly similar in magnitude. In any event,
both imply that an increased expected value of economic loss is associated with weight
gain.
Table 5 shows regression results from Equation 3. In the boy panel, the coefficient
of LayoffRate·SOE is mostly significant in the range of 8.6 to 10 using BMIZ as the
dependent variable, while the coefficient of FinancialLoss·SOE is insignificant across all
regressions. This result suggests that the impact on boys’ BMIZ arises mainly from the
possibility of job loss, rather than the severity of financial loss of parents if laid off. In the
girl panel, BMIZ is not statistically significantly affected by the layoffs.
Our finding that the probability of unemployment has a relatively larger impact is
consistent with significant non-financial impacts of unemployment and much previous
literature on well-being and health (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2001; Cylus et al., 2015).
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7.3 Parental versus Maternal Treatment
In the main model, we define the treated group as at least one parent working in the
SOE prior to the reform. We now test paternal, maternal, and double treatment effects by
incorporating the interactions of E(Loss) and (1) father, (2) mother, and (3) both working
in the SOE prior to the SOE reform separately.
Table 6 reports the estimates. In the boy panel, comparing columns 1-3, a 4.26-
percentage-point increase in E(Loss) increases BMIZ by 0.52 SD if the father works in
the SOE, 0.79 SD if both parents work in the SOE, and is not statistically significant for
those whose mothers work in the SOE. No significance is found in the girl panel. We
suggest that the much larger and clearer effects of increased economic insecurity from
the father’s side highlights the father’s main bread earner role in Chinese families. In our
sample, 93% of fathers are working and 85% of mothers are working, but the mother’s
average monthly salary is only 59% of the father’s.
7.4 Unconditional Quantile Regression
Since weight gain for thin people may have much less impact on health than a similarly
sized weight gain for the already overweight, we ask whether increased parental economic
insecurity results in higher weight gain in children who are already heavier. OLS results
only estimate average effects, but weight gain caused by heightened economic insecurity
is not necessarily constant. Rohde et al. (2017) use quantile regressions on Australian
panel data and find greater effects of economic insecurity on weight gain in the already
overweight population, which implies that repeated stress has a cumulatively increasing
impact. To investigate this, we employ a quantile regression on a pooled cross-sectional
sample. Our hypothesis is that a larger coefficient of E(Loss)·SOE is associated with a
higher weight quantile.
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We adopt the re-centered influence function proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) to es-
timate unconditional quantile regressions.16 Table 7 presents quantile estimates at each
decile, using our preferred specification. For boys’ BMIZ, the estimates of E(Loss)·SOE
are positive and significant at q=0.6 (β1 = 6.8), q=0.7 (β1 = 9.1), and q=0.8 (β1 = 10.1),
and not significant for those below the 6th decile. The quantile regressions suggest that
the layoff policy has larger effects on boys at higher quantiles, and boys at the median
and below are not significantly affected. Their girl counterparts do not present significant
effects of E(Loss)·SOE in the quantile estimation.
Figure 8 shows the plot of the coefficient of SOE·E(Loss) across all quantiles. The
coefficient of SOE·E(Loss) is trending upward for boys, suggesting a larger weight gain
on already heavier boys. The patterns for girls are not monotonic. The unconditional
quantile regressions suggest that the effects of economic stress are not constant for boys,
as it does not significantly affect underweight and normal-weight boys but increases the
weight of already overweight or obese boys. These results thus suggest a more serious
public health problem than the OLS estimation might imply.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines the intergenerational effects of increased parental economic insecu-
rity on children’s weight gain. Using the natural experiment of large-scale layoffs during
China’s SOE reform in the late 1990s, we calculate the expected economic loss using
SOE layoff rates and average financial loss at province-year levels. Compared to children
in the non-SOE (control group), children in the SOE (treated group) experience different
levels of changes in expected economic loss due to changes in layoff policy (treatment of
16More controls in pooled cross-sections estimation include children’s age, age squared, parents’ age and
level of education, number of children, and province of residence to control for observed characteristics.
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different intensity). Exploiting this exogenous variation in changes in parental economic
insecurity, we use longitudinal data CHNS and a generalised DID methodology to exam-
ine the BMI Z-score (WHO standard) of treated and control children. Individual fixed
effects and year fixed effects control for time-invariant unobservable and time-variant ob-
servables.
Compared to children with parents in the non-SOE sector, there are consistently
significant increases in the BMIZ for boys. If the expected economic loss increases by
4.26 percentage points (the median treatment effect) the BMIZ increases by 0.42 SD,
which is equivalent to a 17-percentile increase in BMI distribution, a 0.88 kg/m2 increase
in BMI, or a 1.8 kg in weight gain for a medium-build 10-year-old boy. The layoff rate
and financial loss from layoffs are used to examine the differential impact of economic
insecurity. The layoff rate (i.e., the probability of job loss) plays a greater role than the
prospective financial loss in the determination of children’s weight change. We emphasise
that the effects of potential job losses remain significant for boys, with a larger effect size,
even when neither parent actually lost their job, highlighting the importance of anxiety
about possible future events, in addition to realizations.
In this paper, the average financial loss of laid-off workers is calculated from the
average living subsidies of laid-off workers compared to the average wage of on-post SOE
workers in the province in the same time period. This provides the closest approximation
of the average income fall a laid-off worker experiences, given data available. Giles et al.
(2006) found that the SOE reform also reduces the wage of the remaining SOE workers.
Therefore, the financial loss from layoffs may be underestimated. Another limitation is
the lack of reputable overweight standards specifically for current Chinese children in
existing literature. BMI Z-scores provide an age-gender-specific reference for weight
gain using international samples, but are not customised for Chinese children. Future
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research can be done when such thresholds are established.
This study suggests that layoff policy changes can have health consequences for the
children in affected families. When designing economic reforms, policy makers should
therefore take intergenerational health effects into consideration for the cost-benefit anal-
ysis, as child obesity significantly increases public health costs. If parental job loss has a
significant negative impact on child obesity, a higher public health cost may be associated
with unemployment than previous studies have suggested. Our results also suggest that
the benefits of an adequate social safety net are partly received by children. Adequate
unemployment insurance benefits, effective job training programs, and accessible social
assistance can help protect families against the risk of economic loss, and thereby reduce
the negative effects on children.
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Appendix I
The CHNS question asked (1989-1991, Variable B6):
In what type of work unit do you work?
1 state enterprise or institute
2 small collective
3 large collective
4 joint venture
5 individual or private
6 other
7 unknown
We identify the child in the treated group if either parent answers 1 to this question.
State-Owned Enterprises refer to non-corporation economic units in which all assets
are owned by the state and that have registered in accordance with the Regulation of the
People’s Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises.
Excluded from this category are sole state-funded corporations in limited liability corpo-
rations (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018).
Laid-off workers: Due to production or operational difficulties of state-sector enter-
prises, employees leave the job involuntarily and do not take other jobs in the same enter-
prise. They still retain a labour relation (i.e., having an effective work contract) with the
original enterprise (China Ministry of Labour and National Bureau of Statistics of China,
1997).
In this study, change in expected economic loss in the SOE is the reason for greater eco-
nomic insecurity, which can be thought about in three ways: First, the possibility of being
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laid off (layoff rate), where
LayoffRatept =
Number of laid-off workers in state sectorpt
Number of state sector workerspt
(4)
i.e., the layoff rate is measured by the number of laid-off workers divided by the total
number of state sector workers in province p and year t; second, the financial loss if laid
off:
FinancialLosspt = 1−
Average living subsidies of laid-off workerspt
Average wage rate of on-the-job workers in state sectorpt
(5)
i.e., the average percentage income drops for laid-off workers in province p and year t;
and third, the expected economic loss:
E(EconomicLoss)pt = LayoffRatept ·FinancialLosspt (6)
i.e., the product of probability of layoff and financial loss in the event of job loss in
province p and year t.
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Figure 1: Average Expected Economic Loss by Province and Year
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Source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook 1996-2004.
Note: The expected economic loss is the product of layoff rate and financial loss
if laid off at the province level.
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Figure 2: Expected Economic Loss by Layoff Policy Peak Year in CHNS Provinces
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Source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook 1996-2004.
The expected economic loss is the product of layoff rate and financial loss if laid off at
the province level.
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Figure 3: Parallel Trends in Parental Employment and Child Outcome: SOE versus
Non-SOE
70
%
80
%
90
%
10
0%
Pe
rc
en
t
91 93 97 00 04 06
Year
Fathers employed
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Pe
rc
en
t
91 93 97 00 04 06
Year
Mothers employed
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
BM
IZ
 (S
D)
91 93 97 00 04 06
Year
Boys: BMI Z-score
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
BM
IZ
 (S
D)
91 93 97 00 04 06
Year
Girls: BMI Z-score
95% CI Non-State Sector State Sector
Non-State Sector
Source: CHNS 1991 to 2006.
Note: The solid line represents the average of the outcome in the SOE. The dashed line
represents non-SOE, and the shaded area indicates its 95% CI. The SOE and the non-
SOE present the same trend before the reform. The trends diverge during the reform and
converge after the reform.
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Figure 4: Parallel Trend Test: Estimated Coefficient αt
Source: CHNS 1989-2004
Note: The estimation uses 1991 as the base year. Parallel trend tests before introduction
of the policy, treated and control show a similar trend. It shows that only during the pol-
icy, the outcome diverges. Therefore, no significant difference in the pre-existing trend
is found.
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Figure 5: BMIZ Distribution in the SOE with and without the SOE Reform
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Source: CHNS 1997-2004
Note: Hypothetical counterfactual analysis (E(Loss)=0) shows that the BMIZ would
have been more left-distributed than the actual BMIZ distribution. Children would have
had smaller BMIZ if the SOE reform had not occurred.
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Figure 6: GDP and Employment Share in SOE vs Non-SOE
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Source: China Labour Statistics Yearbook 1997-2004.
Note: The employment rate and GDP share declined in the SOE sector and increased
in the non-SOE sector. This suggests that as economic insecurity in the SOE escalated,
economic insecurity in the non-SOE started to decline because of more employment op-
portunities and greater aggregate income share. This implies that the gap we measured
in our baseline model is in fact smaller than the actual decline in economic insecurity in
the SOE.
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Figure 7: Lower-bound Estimation Using DID
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Note: Panel A shows the unbiased gap between the SOE and non-SOE, and Panel B
shows the estimated gap between the SOE and non-SOE. The gap we measured in the
baseline model (Panel B) is in fact smaller than the actual decline in economic insecurity
in the SOE (as the control group is increasing, not constant) shown as Panel A. Thus, we
underestimate the actual economic insecurity change, and the baseline DID provides a
lower-bound estimation.
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Figure 8: The Coefficient of E(Loss) ·State on Children’s BMI Z-Score Over Quantiles
Note: The blue line represents the coefficient of SOE·E(Loss) on the vertical axis with
the corresponding quantile on the horizontal axis.The coefficient of SOE·E(Loss) is
trending upward for boys, suggesting a larger weight gain on already heavier boys. The
patterns for girls are not monotonic.
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